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Egypt is able to exact an exceptionally high inflation tax without
causing high  inflation because of  the private  sector's  large
financial holdings. Causes for these large holdings are complex
and include money illusion, foreign exchange restrictions, and
financial repression. Because of the reliance on the inflation tax
- which makes Egypt's overall tax regime fairly regressive -
any liberalization of financial markets would put pressure on
domestic prices, if the underlying budget deficit cannot adjust
fast enough.  I
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Although Egypt's budget deficit is far above the  This compares with 0.5 percent of GDP that
level found in other low-middle-income coun-  households pay in income tax. Although income
tries, the inflation rate in Egypt has never been  tax in Egypt is fairly progressive, the greater
very high. This is because the country has  reliance on the inflation tax makes Egypt's
managed to finance thef - budget deficits by  overall  tax structure fairly regressive.
resorting to an inflation .ax that, at II percent of
GDP in 1987, constitutes a large share of total  Dinh and Giugale argue that-
tax revenues.  By contrast, conventional tax
revenues come to only 17 percent of GDP.  *  Money illusion cannot last forever-  if
inflation begins to increase, Egyptian households
Dinh and Giugale report a large, underlying  will ultimately move out of underperforning
inflation-tax base - from which the Egyptian  domestic assets, creating strains on the banking
govemment has collected substantial revenues  system.
- that exists because of money balances held
willingly or unwillingly by the private sector.  *  If foreign exchange. and interest rate controls
Egyptians have opted to hold underperforming  are lifted - as part of an adjustment program,
domestic currency deposits for a variety of  for instance - and if the budget deficit fails to
reasons:  restrictions on domestic residents'  adjust fast enough, the large base for the infla-
freedom to legally convert Egyptian pounds into  tion tax will disappear, leading to a rise in
U.S. dollars; a limited black market; high  inflation rates to near Latin American levels.
insurance costs for the average investor of
maintaining assets in other forms, such as gold;  *  Understanding the role and size of the
and a mild money illusion in the early 1980s.  inflation tax in Egypt will help in determining
the sequencing and equity aspects of any future
The authors find that the private business  refonn program.
sector, with a net borrowing position of 14
percent of GDP, has benefited from the inflation  *  The financial side cannot continue to bear
tax.  Households, on the other hand, pay more of  the burden for the real side; Egypt must move
the inflation tax than other sectors, tuming over  swiftly to cut its budget deficit, the underlying
8 percent of GDP to the govemment this way.  cause of its dependence on the inflation tax.
AffairsComplex.AnobjectiveofthcscriesistoPgetthscbyo  fREdingsoutquickly,oven  ifCprcsentations  arlessthanfullypolished.
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Despit many favorable  conditions  such  as a skilled  labor  force  and
abundant  ne  :al  resources,  in the  last  decade  Egypt  has not  realized  the
potential  for  economic  development  latent  in  these  conditions. The  ('ominant
rol_  of the  public  sector  in  key  productive  sectors  and  the  system  of
administered  prices  in all  markets  (goods,  factor,  and  foreign  exchange
markets)  has discouraged  private  incentives  and  caused  inefficient  use  of
resources. At the  same  time,  output  growth  has resulted  from  fast-growing,
trade-impairing  domestic  absorption.  This  situation  has  been  caused  by large
public  sector  deficits  financed  by a combination  of foreign  and  domestic
borrowing  with inflation  taxation  in the  context  of repressed  financial
markets.
Depending  on  how the  public  sector  deficits  are  measured,  they  could
reach  20  percent  or more  of GDP.  Even  under  the  deficit  definition  used  by
the  IMF's  Government  Financial Statiatics' for  international  comparison,  the
average  budget  deficit  in the  mid-1980s  amounted  to  over 11  percent  of GDP for
Egypt,  compared  with  about  3  percent  for  Turkey  and Peru,  11  percent  for
Brazil,  and 5  percent  for  Argentina. Part  of this  deficit  was financed  by
borrowing  from  abroad,  resulting  in the  debt  overhang  that  Egypt  currently
faces. Another  part  was financed  by domestic  borrowing. Yet  another
substantial  part  of the  deficit  was financed  by printing  money  and  by
financial  repression. This last  method  of  budget  deficit  financing  is the
concern  of this  paper.
At first  glance,  the  money  financing  of the  budget  deficit  may  not
appear  to  be large. Given  the  size  of the  deficit,  if it  had  been financed
largely  through  money  printing,  one  would  have expected  inflation  rates
comparable  to those  experienced  by Latin  American  countries. But  inflation  in
Egypt,  despite  all  the  difficulties  of  measuring  inflation  in a  price-
controlled  economy,  has never  been  very  high--at  least  compared  with other
countries. One  can  always  argue  with officiai  statistics,  which  do not  show
the  true  movement  in prices  of  many goods. Nevertheless,  it is  undeniable
that  inflation  has never  reached  the  proportion  experienced  by other  countries
with  much less  budget  deficit  to finance.
In this  paper,  we  argue  that  a  detailed  calculation  of  inflation  tax,
defined  broadly  to include  the  ability  to issue  high-power  money  and  to
generate  revenue  from financial  repression,  shows  that  the  public  sector  has
been able  to extract  significant  revenue  from  this  tax.  For  simplicity,  we
call  this  broadly  defined  concept  the  "inflation  tax in  general."  Using  a  new
approach  to the  estimation  of  the inflation  tax  in  general  that is  based  on
institutional  accounts  of  the  private  sector,  we  found  that  this  tax,  which  is
levied  mainly  on  households,  has  been  exceptionally  large  (relative  to  both
the  Egyptian  economy  and in  comparison  with  other  countries),  due  to the  large
holding  of financial  assets  by the  private  sector. The  causes  for this
1/  For  the  purpose  of  cross  country  comparison,  we  have  used  the  Government
Financlal  StatiatiCa  data.  Actual  data  on  the  country's  public  finance
show  much  larger  budget  deficits.2
holding  ar',  ;omplex;  they  include  some  money  illusion;  control  of the  foreign
exchange  market,  which  reduces  the  conversion  of savings  to hard  currency
(dollarization)  but does  not preclude  it;  and  financial  repression. We found
that  when these  factors  cease  to exist  (for  instance,  when the foreign
exchange  and financial  markets  are  liberalized),  and  if the  underlying  budget
defiuit  cannot  be adjusted  fast  enough,  pressures  on domestic  prices  will
build  up quickly. Through  the  proposed  approach,  we quantified  the inflation
rates  that  would  result  from  such  a situation. In reviewing  the  equity
aspects  of this  tax,  we found  the  tax  highly  regressive,  which  suggests  that
the  conventional  view of the  progressive  nature  of the  formal  tax system  may
be mistaken.
Section  II describes  the  main features  of the  Egyptian  economy,  focusing
on the  actual  linkages  between  Egypt's  fiscal,  monetary,  and  debt  policies,  as
well  as the  impact  of these  policies  on inflation. It also  traces  their
evolution  in the  last  decade,  leading  up to  the  current  situation. Section
III  proposes  a  new approach  to the  estimation  of the  inflation  tax  and  applies
this  approach  to estimating  the  revenue  from this  tax  in the  case  of Egypt.
We estimate  that  this informal  source  of revenue  could  exceed  10 percent  of
GDP, compared  with total  conventional  tax  revenue  to the  central  government  of
about  17  percent  of JDP. This  magnitude  of inflation  tax  is large  compared
with other  countries. We then  review  the  causes  for  this  tax.  In Section  IV,
we decompose  the inflation  tax  by business  and  household  sectors  in  order  to
compare  the  equity  aspects  of this  tax  with  other  taxes  paid  by these  sectors.
Section  V presents  our  summary  and  policy  implications.
II.  THE  BUDGET  DEFICIT  AND  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  IN EGYPT
Throughout  the  1980s,  the  Egyptian  economy  remained  heavily  domina:ed  by
the  public  sector. By all  measures,  its  deficit  has  been  huge.2 The
definition  of this  deficit,  however,  is  complicated  by the  existence  of a
large  public  enterprise  sector,  whose  activities  are  controlled  by the
government  but  whose  accounte  are  not  known. Furthermore,  the  budget  as
administered  by the  Ministry  of Finance  excludes  the  Social  Security  Fund,
which  makes  international  comparison  difficult.
The  best  proxy  for  a consolidated  account  of the  whole  public  sector  is
the  so-called  "Central  Government  Account,"  which  includes  the  budgets  of the
central  government, local  governments,  and  public  service  authorities;  the
net  profit  transfers  from  public  sector  companies;  and  the investment  budgets
2/  In Egypt  the  public  sector  includes  the  central  government,  local
government,  and  public  entities.  The latter  include: (i)  the  service
authorities  whose  budgets  are  integrated  into  the  central  government,
e.g.,  agriculture  research;  (ii)  economic  authorities  such  as the  Suez
Canal  Authority;  and (iii)  public  sector  companies. Usually  only  the
second  and  third  categories  are  considered  public  enterprises. In this
paper,  however,  the  relevant  concept of "public  sector"  encompasses
every  institution  whose  overall  deficit  or surplus  is financed,  directly
or indirectly,  through  money  creation.3
of  all  public  sector  companies.  Ot  a  cash  basis,  the  deficit  on  th. account
reached  20  percent  of  GDP  during  the  1980s3.  Table  1  shows  some  features  of
the  Egyptian  economy  for  the  fiscal  years  1981-88.  (The  Egyptian  fiscal  year
runs  !rom  July  1  to  June  30.)
Table  1. '"YPT:  SOME  MACROECONOMIC  INDICATORS
(Average  annual  g;:owth  rates,  unless  otherwise  indicated)
Fiscal  Years  1981-88
FY1981-86 FY1987  FY1988
GDP  growth  (real  terms,  p.a.)  6.7  2.5  3.9
Inflation  (as  X growth  in  CPI)  16.7  25.2  15.2
Budget  Deficit  (X  of  GDP)  22  20  24
Source:  Ministry  of  Planning,  Central  Bank  of  Egypt
Until  the  mid-1980s,  the  economy  grew  rapidly,  fueled  by  the  large
inflow  of  petroleum  revenues,  workers"  remittances,  and  tourism.  These  three
sources  accounted  for  over  70  percent  of  foreign  exchange  receipts.  The
increase  in  external  income  helped  finance  the  rise  in  investment  and
consumption;  it  also  contributed  to  the  growth  of  government  revenues,  which
rose  from  27  percent  of  GDP  to  43  percent  during  the  decade  1974-1984.  This
growth,  in  turn,  helped  finance  social  programs  that  improved  food  intake,
clothing  and  durable  goods  consumption,  education,  and  health.  The  result  of
this  rapid  growth  in  domestic  demand,  however,  has  been  widening  deficits  in
both  the  current  account  and  the  central  government  budget.
The  abundance  of  foreign  exchange  created  all  the  classic  symptoms  of
the  "Dutch  disease":  an  extraordinary  increase  in  foreign  earnings  led  to  a
deterioration  of  the  non-oil  tradeable  sectors  in  the  economy.  Commodity
exports,  excluding  oil, fell  from  US$1.6  billion  to  US$ 1.1  billion  during
this  decade,  as  the  real  effective  exchange  rate  appreciated  and  the  domestic
demand  outgrew  domestic  supply.  Both  agriculture  and  manufacturing  declined
as  a  share  of  GDP  and  of  total  employment,  while  domestic  trade,  construction,
private  sector  services,  and  government  administration  grew  rapidly.  The
rovernment  sector  grew  fastest,  creating  low  productivity  employment  for  about
half  of  the  net  increase  in  the  labor  force,  while  few  new  jobs  were  created
in  agriculture  and  industry.  Rigid  state  controls  on  both  output  and  factor
prices,  combined  with  controls  on  the  foreign  exchange  market,  created
distortions  in  the  aconomy.  Egyptian  domestic  nominal  prices  moved
increasingly  out  of  line  with  real  economic  costs  and  prices.  Financial  and
2./  Note  that  this  definition  of  the  Central  Government  Account  encompasses
more  of  the  economy  than  does  the definition  of  the  public  sector  used
in  Government  Financial  Statistlcs. In  particular,  it  differs  in  the
treatment  of  social  security  and  of  public  enterprise  investments  and
their  self-financing  investments.4
economic  profitability  pointed  in opposite  directions  in  almost  all  sectors,
providing  the  wrong  signals  to  producers  and  consumers.
In the  mid-198us,  the  four  main sources  of foreign  exchange  receipts--
the three  ab,ve-mentioned  exports  plus Suez  canal  earnings--started  to fall.
Thc  economy A,owed  and  the  financial  disequilibria  worsened  significantly.
Despite  measures  taken  by the  government,  the  deficits  in the  current  account
and the  budget  remained  unsustainably  high--at  9  percent  and  23  percent  of GDP
in fiscal  1986,  respectively--while  the  external  debt  reached  120  percent  of
GDP.  Inflation  accelerated  to 25  percent  in fiscal  1987  from  an average  of 17
percent  during  the  preceding  5  years. The authorities  responded  by tightening
import  controls,  by accumulating  arrears  in foreign  debt  payments,  and  by
using  more  of the  foreign  currency  deposits  accumulated  in the (public)
commercial  banks.
C_..early,  these  trends  coull  not continue  for  long  before  a crisis
appeared,  and  in 1987  Egypt  entered  into  a standby  agreement  with the  IMF.
The  agreement  subsequently  lapsed.  Since  then,  there  have  been  new, though
partial,  efforts  to  undertake  a  program  that  combines  stabilization  with
structural  adjustment. These  efforts  are  the  focus  of current  negotiations
with the  IMF  and the  World  Bank (1990-1991)  and  are  not discussed  here.  For
this  reason,  and  partly  due  to data  limitation,  this  p&per  deals  only  with the
period  from  fiscal  year 1981  to 1988.
During  this  period,  fiscal,  monetary,  and  exchange  rate  policies  were
not  pursued  with sufficient  vigor  to attain  internal  and  external  balances.
On one  hand,  between  fiscal  1982  and  fiscal  1987,  oil  profit  and  oil-related
revenue  dropped  from  14 percent  of GDP (of  which  7  percent  was tax)  to 2
percent  as a result  of the  drop  in oil  prices. No fiscal  policy  can  be
expected  to  make  up for  such  a precipitous  shortfall  in so short  a  period. On
the  other  hand,  no extraordinary  effort  was  made to improve  the  low  elasticity
uf  the  tax  system,  as indicated  by the  low  buoyancy  (below  1) during  the
period. Total  revenues  thus  dropped  from  42  percent  of GDP in  fiscal  1981  to
some  30  percent  over  this  period. Excluding  oil  and  Suez  revenues,  tctal
government  revenues  still  fell  in real  terms  by about  2  percent  per  annum  over
this  period.
Expenditures  could  not  be reduced  quickly  enough  to effect  a significant
reduction  in the  huge  budget  deficit. Expressed  in  real  terms,  total
government  expenditures  fell  significantly,  especially  in  the  two  areas  of
subsidies  and  the  wage  bill.  Even  so,  these  adjustments  were inadequate  to
prevent  the  budget  deficit  from  climbing  above  20  percent.
Of course,  the  operational  public  sector  deficit  is a  more accurate
measure  of the  fiscal  burden  on the  economy  than  the  budget  deficit  on a cash
basis.  In  principle,  if agents  do not  suffer  from  money  illusion,  they  will
make their  portfolio  and  saving  decisions  according  to the (expected)  real
interest  rate  that they  receive  from  che  government  debt,  rather  than  the
nominal  rate.  On this  basis,  the  computation  of the  deficit  should  take  into
account  real  interest  payments,  not  nominal  ones.  This  is precisely  the
essence  of the  operational  definition  of deficit.  As long  as agents  are
rational,  the  usual  measure  of cash  deficit  over  GDP overestimates  the  real5
impact  of the  public  sector's  results. In another  study  (Giugale  and  Dinh,
1990),  we have computed  an  estimate  of the  operational  deficit  of Egypt  and
found  that it is larger  still  than  the  simple  cash  deficit  in  high-inflation
Argentina.
One would  expect  that,  cver  time,  such  high  budget  deficits  would  lead
to  higher  inflation  rates;  the  non-inflationary  me 1s of financing  the  deficit
would  quickly  disappear. Also,  economic  agents  wotld  adjust  their  behavior  by
running  down their  cash  balances,  thus  generating  even less  of a base for  the
inflation  tax.  However,  as mentioned  above,  inflation  in  Egypt  has  remained
mild.  Between  fiscal  1981  and fiscal  1986,  the  growth  in  the  consumer  price
index  averaged  about  17  percent  per  annum  (Table  l).Since  then,  it  has  hovered
between  10 and 25  percent.
Although  fiscal  policy  itself  was  not  expansionary  during  this  period,'
the  financing  of  budget  deficits  of such  magnitude  requires  substantial
monetization. In rough  numbers,  the  deficits  of over  20  percent  of GDP  during
the  period  fiscal  1982-87  were financed  with external  inflow  (about  4 to 5
percent  of GDP),  the  social  security  fund (between  6 to 8  percent  of GDP),  and
by monetization  in the  form  of  borrowing  from  the  central  bank (for  the  rest
of the  deficit,  or at least  7 to 10  percent  of GDP).  Borrowiing  through  issue
of domestic  bonds  was limited,  as the  treasury  bonds  held  by commercial  banks
were quickly  discounted  at the  central  bank.  Monetary  policy  during  this
period was accommodating  to the  government  budget;  net  domestic  credit  to the
central  government  and  public  entities  more  than  doubled. Foreign  financing
of the  deficits  led  to the  debt  overhang;  the  external  debt  doubled  from  some
US$22  billion  in fiscal  1981  to about  US$43  billion  in fiscal  1986.
III.  THE  BUDGET  DEFICIT  AND INFLATION  TAXATION
In the  case  of Egypt,  foreign  resources  have only  partially  financed  the
public  sector  deficits. Roughly  half of the  fiaanciz.,g  has come  from  domestic
borrowing  other  than  from  the  central  bank,  one-fourti  from  foreign  credit,
and the  rest  from  money  printing. As mentioned  above,  f1lation  has
remarkably  fluctuated  around  "only"  20  percent. In this  section,  however,  we
will argue  that  there  has  been an  underlying,  particularlv  large  inflation-
tax  base from  which  the  government  collected  substantial  revenues. We further
argue  that  the  inflation  tax  revenue  collected  by the  public  sector  as a  whole
(defined  below)  is enormous  by international  standards  simply  because  of the
large  money  balances  that  the  private  sector  (mainly  households)has  held,
either  willingly  or unwillingly. In  effect,  the  real  value  of the  public
sector's  domestic  debt  has  been  diluted  by inflation.
As Keynes  (1923)  phrased  it,  the  infIation  tax  is no different  from
income  tax  or an excise  tax  on  beer.  This  erosion  of the  public  debt is
equivalent  to  a tax  because,  like  other  taxes,  it  lowers  the  private  sector's
disposable  income  and  increases  the  government's  revenue. In this  paper,  we
h/  The  expansion  in domestic  demand  has  more to do  with the  exchange  rate
policy  which  held the  pound  overvalued.6
define  the  tax to include  two  forms. On the  one  hand,  the  money  held  by the
private  sector  does  not  receive  any  interest  payme-tt,  and  therefore  the
erosion  of its  real  value  is equal  to the  inflati)n  rate.  On the  other  hand,
other  forms  of private  sector  assots  such  as time  and  saving  deposits  receive
nominal  returns  which  ale  often  far  below  the  inflation  rate.  The  rate  of
erosion  of the true  value  of these  assets  is the  difference  between  the
inflation  rate  and the  nominal  remuneration.  Against  this,  one  should  take
into  consideration  the  subsidies  received  by the  private  sector  in the  form  of
deposits  by the  public  sector. These  deposits,  too,  reflect  the  erosion  of
true  asset  value. The general  principle  is that  in an  unanticipated
inflationary  environme.at,  the  gainers  are  the  net  borrowers  and  the  losers  are
the  net lenders. The  net inflation  tax  is the  sum  of the  inflation  tax  and
the  subsidies.
More formally,  let  IT  be the  inflation  tax,  dM  be the  increase  in  money
needed  to  compensate  for  the  erosion  in real  balances  and  P the  price  level.
Then the  above  definition  yields:
(1)  IT-  dM/P
Multiplying  both sides  by M/M yields
(2)  IT-(dM/M)*(M/P)
where  dM/M  is the  rate  of growth  of money  supply.
In the  long  run,  at the  steady  state  with no real  growth  in  output,  dM/M
can  be equated  with PI, the  inflation  rate.
(3)  IT-  PI*(M/P)
Hence,  the inflation  tax  should  be thought  of as consisting  of a tax  rate (PI)
applied  to a base,  which  is the  real  money  supply  (including  time  and  saving
deposits  to the  extent  that  they  have  not  been  paid a remuneration  compatible
with the inflation  rate). When  output  growth  is  nonzero,  of course,  real
output  will grow;  the  relation  between  money  supply  growth  and  the  inflation
rate is then  given  by:
(4)  dM/M-PI+G
where  G is the  growth  of  real output. The  definition  of inflation  tax in  this
paper  therefore  includes  under  this  tax  the  part  attributed  to growth  of real
output,  commonly  referred  to  as seigniorage.  While  the  distinction  between
(3)  and (4)  is important  in  understanding  the  contribution  of  monetization  to
inflation,  it is  not relevant  to the  discussion  of budge-  deficit  financing,
for  which  equation  (2)  is the  relation  that  matters.7
A.  An  Apps',!iuch  to  the  Reptimation  of  the  Inflation  Tax
A straigntforward  way  to  estimate  the  inflation  tax  is  to  derive  it  from
the  financial  accounts  of  the  consolidated  public  sector. In  the  case  of
Egypt,  due  to  the  lack  of  detailed  information  on tnat  sector,  the
calculation  of  this  tax  is  an  involving  task. The  approach  we  take  is  exactly
opposite  to  that  applied  for  other  countries;  namely,  we  first  derive  the
accounts  for  the  consolidated  private  sector,  consisting  of  households  and
private  business.'  To  do  this,  we  first  integrate  the  balance  heets  of  the
central  bank,  the  commercial  banks,  the  investment  and  specialized  banks,  and
the  National  Investment  Bank  (NIB),  keeping  track  of  the  assets  and
liabilities  of  these  financial  institutions  and  of  the  following  agents  vis-
a-vis  each  other: the  central  government  and  the  public  authorities,  the
public  sector  enterprises,  the  household  secttr,  and  the  private  business
sector. 7
We  shall  see  that  the  last  two  sectors  constitute  the  main  payers  of  the
inflation  t&x. While  it  could  be  argued  that  the  private  portion  of  the
commercial  banks  also  belongs  to  the  private  sector  and  therefore  is  also  an
inflation  taxpayer,  its  contribution  is  very  small.  Recent  evidence  shows
that  the  private  portion  constitutes  less  than  20  percent  of  the  total  assets
of  the  commercial  banking  system.  Moreover,  the  profit  margin  of  this  sector
is  small.  For  this  reason,  and  also  due  to  the  lack  of  detailed  data,  this
analysis  assigns  commercial  banks  entirely  to  the  public  sector.
As  will  be  shown  shortly,  the  household  sector,  through  deposits  in  the
banking  sector  and  the  NIB  is  a  net  creditor  to  each  and  every  institution  in
Egypt.'  A snapshot  of  the  economy  at  the  end  of  fiscal  1987  would  show  that
5/  Daniel  Oks  first  estimated  the  inflation  tax  by  financial  accounts  in  a
Worla  Bank  Report  (Peru,  Report  Number  7460-PE,  December  15,  1988).  The
approach  taken  here  differs  in  the  treatment  of  the  tax  and  in  the  use  of
detailed  accounts  of  the  private  sector  to  characterize  it.
W/ In  the  section  on  equity  aspects  of  the  inflation  tax,  it  will  become  clear
that  this  approach  allows  us  to  compare  the  incidence  of  this  tax  with  that  of
other  taxes  paid  by  the  private  sector.
2/  The  Egyptian  financial  system  consists  of  the  central  bank,  the  NIB,  over
40  commercial  banks  (including  4  p"!lic  sector  banks),  33  investment  and
business  banks  (of  which  11  are  J;int  ventures  and  private  banks),  and  4
specialized  banks  (including  2  real  estate  banks,  the  industrial  bank, and
the  bank  for  agricultural  credit  with  its  17  affiliates  in  the  governorates).
In  addition,  there  are  at  least  7  insurance  institutions  and  over  300  Islamic
development  companies.  The  NIB  is  essentially  a government-owned  institution
that  extends  long-term  investment  loans  to  public  enterprises.
fL/ See  previous  footnote.  Sources  of  funds  for  the  NIB  come  from  the
"captive"  sources  of  the  Social  Insurance  Fund,  the  Pension  Fund,  and  the  Post
Office  Savings.6
households  and  foreign  sectors  basically  financed  the  whole  economy. The
largest  net  borrower  is the  central  government  (53  percent  of GDP),  closely
followed  by commersial  banks including  the  four  largest  public  sector  banks.
The  public  enterprise  sector  owed  debt  worth  about  41 perceat  of GDP:  the
central  bank owed  about  19  percent,  while  private  business  owed  only  14
percent.
Although  the  inflation  tax  could  be calculated  in  an easier  way, tle
approach  used  here  is  more illuminating  because  it  shows  the  many  relatione
among  various  agents  and  allows  a  more  accurate  analysia  of the  flow  and stock
variables. While  the  calculation  is inherently  more  cumbersome,  it  does
provide  insights into  the  equity  aspects  of the  tax.
In the  formulation  adopted  here  and in  the  Appendix,  A(i,j)  represents  a
category  of financial  assets  owad  by sector  i  arising  from  transactions  In
sector  j. Similarly,  B(i,j)  is a  category  of financial  liability  of sector  j
to sector  i.  A and  B can  take  the  following  values:
Asset  and  Liability  Categories
B  Bonds
C  Cash  in  vault
DD  Deposits  in domestic  c!irrency
DD CLEAR  Checks  held in clearance
FCDD  Foreign  currency  demand  deposits
FCL  Loans  in foreign  currency
FCTD  Time  deposizs  in foreign  currency
L  Loans  in  domestic  currency
NW  Net  worth
R  Reserves
TD  Time  deposits  in  domestic  currency
The sectors i and  j  can  take  the  following  values:
Financial  Sectors
CBE  Central  bank
BC  Commercial  banks
NIB  National  Investment  Bank
IDB  Other  financial  institutions,  including  the  investment  and
specialized  banks
Nonfinancial  Sectors
CG-PA  Central  government  and  public  authorities
HH  Households
PB  Private  business
PSE  Public  sector  enterprises
For  example,  DD(PB,BC)  represents  demanu  deposits  that  are  an asset  of private
business  from  transactions  in commercial  banks.  It  also  represents  the
corresponding  liability  of the  commercial  banking  sector  to the  private
business  sector.9
Thie  Appendix  illustrates  the  consolidation  of  balance  sheets  for  each  of
the  financial  sectors.  Tables  2  and  3  use  such  balance  sheets  to  derive  the
financial  position  of  the  private  business  &nd  household  sectors.  (The
Appendix  gives  balance  sheets  for  a  single  fiscal  year;  the  tables  summarize
similar  balance  sheets  for  each  of  four  fiscal  years.)
B.  Inflation  Tax  in  Egypt: Estimation  Results
Table  2  shows  the  financial  position  of  the  private  business  sector,
derived  from  balance  sheets  like  those  shown  in  the  Appendix.  All  variables
are  expressed  as  percentages  of  GDP. Private  businesses'  assets  appear  to
have  been  stable,  at  about  a  quarter  of  GDP,  throughout  the  second  half  of  the
1980s.  Their  deposits  in  the  financial  system  are  rather  small,  consisting  of
an  equal  amount  of  demand  deposits  in  domestic  and  in  foreign  currency  used
for  business  transactions.  The  largest  asset  category  is  lending  to  the  NIB,
mostly  from  insurance  companies  and  the  Pension  Fund. On  the  liability  side,
by  far  the  largest  category  is  loans  from  commercial  banks  (17-18  percent  of
GDP),  mostly  in  domestic  currency,  but  an  important  part  is  also  held  in
foreign  currency  (about  7-8  percent  of  GDP). Loans  from  the  investment  banks
and  specialized  banks  also  constitute  an  important  resource.
The  net  borrowing  position  of  the  private  business  sector,  about  14
percent  of  GDP,  means  that  the  sector  has  been  a  beneficiary  of  the  inflation
tax. Moreover,  this  sector  also  holds  a  net  liability  in  foreign  currency.  A
devaluation  could  certaitly  cause  private  Lasiness  some  problems,  although  the
problem  is  not  as  severe  as  it  is  for  other  sectors,  notably  the  central  bank.
Table  3  shows  the  financial  position  of  the  households  sector,  which
turns  out  to  be  the  main  payer  of  the  inflation  tax. At  the  tax's  peak  in
fiscal  1SR7,  households  paid  out  some  8  percent  of  GDP,  or  about  80  percent  of
the  inflation  tax  paid  by  the  entire  economn.  The  largest  category  of
household  assets  was  time  deposits  in  both  domestic  and  foreign  currency.  The
latter  (not  used  in  the  calculation  of  inflation  tax)  has  grown  rapidly  in
recent  years,  surpassing  the  former  in  terms  of  deposits  by  fiscal  1989.
Another  equally  important  category  is  households'  lending  to  NIB,  which
amounted  to  more  than  the  time  deposits  in  the  system.  Table  3  makes  clear
the  extent  to  which  credit  has  been  granted  to  the  household  sector:  less  than
2  percent  of  GDP. It  also  shows  that  consumer  lending  has  not  been
significant;  consequently,  the  use  of  interest  rates  as  an  instrument  for
curbing  final  consumption  may  be  limited.  Foreign  currency  lending  has  been
significant,  amounting  to  about  19  percent  of  GDP  in  fiscal  1987  and  23
percent  in  fiscal  1988.
On  the  basis  of  these  accounts,  the  inflation  tax  for  the  whole  economy
can  be  calculated.  The  computation  excludes  foreign  currency  accounts.  Table
4  shows  components  of  the  inflation  tax  as  percentages  of  GDP. The  first  row
indicates  the  nominal  (i.e.,  before  adjustment  for  inflation),  gross  (i.e.,
before  the  inflation  subsidies)  amount  of  the  tax  calculated  from  the
consolidated  accounts.  The  second  row  shows  this  amount  expressed  in  real
terms  and  represents  the  gross  inflation  tax. The  third  row  shows  the  nominal
subsidies  calculated  from  the  liability  side  of  the  consolidated  accounts.10
Table  2.  NET FINANCIAL  POSITION  OF PRIVATE  BUSINESS
(Percentage  of GDP  at Current  Market  Prices)
FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88
ASSETS  31.9%  33.2%  32.5%  30.1%
C(PB,CBE)  8.2%  8.0%  7.4%  6.0%
DD(PB,BC)  2.1%  2.1%  2.1%  1.7%
DD_CLEAR(PB,BC)  -0.2%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.2%
FCDD(PB,BC)  1.9%  2.3%  2.2%  1.8%
DD(PB,IDB)  0.8%  0.8%  0.7%  0.8%
FCDD(PB,IDB)  0.6%  0.6%  0.5%  0.4%
L(PB,NIB)  18.5%  19.5%  19.8%  19.6%
LIABILITIES  35.5%  39.7%  39.7%  35.3%
LkBC,PB)  16.5%  18.2%  17.4%  15.9%
FCL(BC,PB)  6.8%  7.6%  7.6%  6.2%
L(IDB,PB)  7.3%  8.6%  9.4%  8.9%
FCL(IDB,PB)  5.0%  5.4%  5.2%  4.2%
NET  ASSETS  23.9%  25.4%  25.3%  24.2%
NET  LIABILITIES  35.5%  39.7%  39.7%  35.3%
NET  LENDING  -11.6%  -14.4%  -14.4%  -11.0%
OF WHICH  FC  -9.3%  -10.0%  -10.2%  -8.2%
OF  WHICH  DC  -2.3%  -4.3%  -4.2%  -2.8%
Source: Deriv2d  from  Appendix  data.
The  next  row is the  amount  in the  third  row  expressed  in real  terms. Finally,
the  net inflation  tax  shown  in  row 5 is  calculated  as the  difference  between
row 2  and  row  4.
As Table  4 shows,  the  magnitude  of the  inflation  tax in  Egypt  is
astounding:  It reached  a  peak in fiscal  1987  at 10.6  percent  of GDP.  To
provide  a basis  for  comparison,  total  conventional  tax  revenue  that  year in
the  central  government  budget  is roughly  17  percent  of  GDP.  It is  clear  that,
through  administering  a number  of prices,  including  domestic  interest  rates
and  exchange  rates,  the  government  has  been  able  to extract  enough  marginal
revenue  from  the  inflation  tax  to  avoid  the  need  to accelerate  money  printing,
and through  it,  higher  inflation  rates.11
Table  3.  NET FINANCIAL  POSITION  OF HOUSEHOLDS
(Percentage  of GDP  at Current  Market  Prices)
FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88
ASSETS  72.4%  75.3%  75.8X  77.11
C(HH,CBE)  15.6%  15.0  13.1%  12.4%
DD(HH,BC)  4.1%  3.9%  3.8%  3.5%
DD_CLEAR(HH,BC)  -0.4%  -0.3%  -0.3%  -0.31
FCDD(HH,BC)  1.6%  1.7X  1.81  1.8X
TD(HH,BC)  19.7%  19.8%  19.51  18.7%
FCTD(HH,BC)  9.3%  11.5%  14.0%  17.2%
DD(HH,IDB)  0.1%  0.1%  0.1X  0.11
FCDD(HH,IDB)  0.3%  0.3X  0.3%  0.3%
TD(HH,IDB)  0.7%  0.61  0.61  0.41
FCTD(HH,IDB)  2.7%  2.9%  3.2%  3.51
L(HH,NIB)  18.5%  19.51  19.8%  19.6%
LIABILITIES  1.8%  1.6%  1.5%  1.41
L(BC,HH)  1.5%  1.31  1.1%  1.0%
FCL(BC,HH)  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.11
L(IDB,HH)  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.1%
FCL(IDB,HH)  0.1%  0.1%  0.11  0.2%
NET  ASSETS  57.1%  60.5%  63.01  65.01
NET LIABILITIES  1.86  1.61  1.51  1.4%
NET  LENDING  55.3%  58.9%  61.5%  63.7%
OF  WHICH  FC  13.7%  16.3%  19.11  22.5%
OF  WHICH  DC  41.6%  42.6%  42.4%  41.1%
Source: Derived  from  Appendix  data.
Table  4.  TOTAL  INFLATION  TAX
(Percentage  of  GDP)
FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88
1.  NOM.  TAX,  GROSS  5.91  8.1%  16.71  8.31
2.  REAL  TAX,  GROSS  5.2%  7.0%  13.31  7.21
3.  NON. SUBSIDY  0.5%  1.1%  3.41  0.6%
4.  REAL SUBSIDY  0.41  0.91  2.71  0.5%
5.  NET  NOM. TAX  5.4%  7.0%  13.31  7.7%
6.  NET  REAL TAX  4.8%  6.1%  10.6%  6.7%
Source: World  Bank data12
In  that  context,  each  percentage  point  of  inflation  dilutes  the  real
value  of  the  money  base  and  of  domestic-currency  deposits,  rendering  sizable
revenues.  In  a  rational,  frictionless  situation  that  could  hardly  happen;
savers  do  not  put  their  money  in  deposits  (except  for  transactions  use)  if
they  know  beforehand  that  the  real  value  of  principal-plus-interests  upon
withdrawal  will  be  lower  than  the  real  value  of  their  initial  investment.
Simple  stocking  of  durable  goods  such  as  real  estate  is  more  profitable  and
equally  risky  (i.e.,  riskless).  The  very  contraction  in  the  supply  of  deposit
money  would  eventually  drive  nominal  interest  rates  up  to  positive,  expected
real  levels.
C.  Inflation  Tax: An  International  Perspective
How  does  the  Egyptian  inflation  tax  compare  to  that  of  other  countries?
Table  5  compares  that  tax  in  Egypt  and  Peru,  in  both  gross  and  net  terms.  It
is  clear  that  the  size  of  the  inflation  tax  in  Egypt  far  exceeds  that  of  Peru,
even  though  the  latter  has  an  inflation  rate  exceeding  100  percent.
In  fact,  the  cross  country  comparison  of  inflation  taxes  shown  in  Table
6  indicates  that  Egypt  far  exceeded  other  countries  in  magnitude  of  this  tax.
A  word  of  caution  must  be  added  here  because  the  calculation  used  in  Table  6,
while  uniform  across  all  countries,  is  not  the  same  used  elsewhere  in  this
report.  Table  5,  which  shows  the  inflation  tax  derived  for  Egypt  and  Peru  on  a
more  comparable  basis,  is  better  suited  to  the  purposes  of  this  analysis.
But  how  has  Egypt  been  able  to  extract  so  much  inflation  tax  revenue
from  such  a low  tax  rate? The  answer  is  the  large  base  on  which  the  tax  is
levied.  A comparison  of  the  tax  base  across  countries  will  be  presented
below,  but  first  it  is  important  to  emphasize  that  Egypt's  fortunate  large-
base-cum-low-rate  scenario  has  been  sustainable  only  because  ex  ante,  or
expected,  real  interest  rates  were  negative.  That  is,  for  some  reasons,  there
have  been  investors  willing  (or  obliged)  to  let  their  real  wealth  dilute.
Otherwise,  they  would  have  demanded  nominal  rates  of  return  large  enough  to
compensate  for  their  inflation  expectations  over  the  bonds'  maturity.  This
would  have  caused  higher  nominal  deficits  and,  ceteris  paribus,  higher
monetization  and  inflation.'
From  the  ex  post,  or  actual,  real  interest  rate  series,  we  cannot
unequivocally  infer  the  behavior  of  the  expected  interest  rates;  expectations
are  not  directly  observable.  Optimally,  more  sophisticated  proxies  for
expected  inflation  could  be  used  (ARIMA  fittings,  instrumental  variables
estimation  of  broadly  defined  equations,  inverted  money  demand  models,  etc.).
2/  Of  course,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  government  may  have  unexpectedly
accelerated  inflation  after  floating  its  debt,  and  so  may  have  raised
inflation  tax  revenues  from  investors  who  were  already  locked  in.
However,  this  explanation  is  not  very  convincing.  It  implies  that  for  at
least  a  decade,  the  authorities  were  able  to  deceive  private  agents
without  serious  loss  of  credibility  and,  hence,  without  the  need  to
resort  to  higher  and  higher  inflation  surprises.13
Table 5.  ESTIMATES  OF INFLATION  TAXES  FOR EGYPT  AND PERU
1985,  1986,  1987
As percentage  of GDP
*  - E-gpt  Peru  Egypt  Peru  EgyDt  Peru
1985  1986  1987
Inflation  Tax  5.2  2.5  7.0  3.2  13.3  4.2
Inflation  Subsidy  .4  2.8  .9  1.6  2.7  2.8
Net Inflation  Tax  4.8  -. 3  6.1  1.6  10.6  1.4
Sources: Peru,  World  Bank  Report  Number  7460-PE
Egypt,  Central  Bank  of Egypt  calculation
Table  6.  INFLATION  TAX IN SELECTED  COUNTRIES,  1987
Inflation  tax
Country  (percentage  of  GNP)
Egypt'  11.7
Argentina  4.0









Source: World  Development  Report,  1989,  Box  4.5.
A/  Figures  differ  from  those  in  Tables  4 and  5  because  GNP,
rather  than  GDP, is  used  here.14
However,  the  sheer  magnitude  and  persistence  of the  negativity  of those  real
rates  make it difficult  to  believe  that  it is entirely  due  to forecast  errors.
(Even  rough  survey  evidence  shows  that  Egyptian  agents  know  beforehand  that
government  debt  papers  pay  negative  real  returns).
The fact  that  such  sizable  revenues  could  be realized  with such  a
moderate  inflation  rate  depends  crucially  on the  base  on which  it is  levied.
For  a broad  comparison  across  countries  with financial  repression,  K2 can  be
used as an indicator  of this  base.(Strictly  speaking,  the  base  should  be K2
minus the  foreign  currency  deposits,  as these  do not  generate  any inflation
tax.)  Table  7 shows  the  base of the inflation  tax for  Egypt  and  other
countries  at about  the  same  stage  of development. It is  clear  that  Egypt  has
the  highest  ratio  of money  to  GDP.
D.  Inflation  Rates  for  Alternative  Hypothetical  Money  Holdings
In the  case  of Egypt,  the  calculations  summarized  in  Table  8 show  that
if  the  financial  sector  were of the  average  size  for  a lower-middle  income
country  (i.e.,  if instead  of 94  percent,  the  money  holding  by the  private
sector  is  reduced  by one-half  or one-fifth),  the  inflation  rate  would  have to
be substantially  higher  than  the  actual  level,  to generate  the  same  amount  of
inflation  tax.  Suppose,  for  example,  people  had  held  only one-fifth  of the
cash  plus  demand  and  time  deposits  that  they  actually  held in these  years  To
maintain  the  same  magnitude  of inflation  tax  revenues,  the  inflation  rate
would  have  had to accelerate  to over  100  percent.
E. Causes  for  the  Large  Money  Balances
The large  size  of the  inflation  tax  base,  in turn,  may  be attributed  to
several  factors. First,  money  illusion  may  have played  an important  role.
Second,  foreign  exchange  control  effectively  precludes  the  private  sector  from
holding  more of other  types  of assets,  such  as foreign  currency  deposits.
Third,  interest  has been  exempt  from  income  tax  since  1981. Law 157  of 1981
specified  that  all interest  on deposits  with  banks  and  post offices  is exempt
from  the  tax  on movable  capital.
Why does  a saver  put  part  of his/her  wealth  in  an asset  that  he/she  can
rationally  expect  will  lose  value? Why do Egyptian  depositors  accept
negative  expected  real interest  rates? A simple  explanation  would  be that
those  agents  are  not  rational;  they  suffer  from  some  degree  of  money-illusion
and  do not fully  understand  the  real implications  of inflation.  Although  we
cannot  discard  this  argument  outright,  it  has  some  weaknesses.  First,  the
depositors  are  not  homogeneous  in terms  of information;  both individual  savers
(who  presumably  are  uninformed)  and  professional  corporate  managers
participate  in the  Egyptian  deposit  market. Second,  the  negativity  of real
interest  rates  on deposits  has  been  operative  for  at least  a decade;  by now,
the  real loss  of wealth  should  have supplied  savers  with  a reasonable15
Table 7.  MONEY AND INFLATION
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Average Outstanding  Average
Money  (% of GDP)  GDP Deflator
Countries  1965  1980  1987  1980-87
Egypt  35.3  52.2  93.8  9.2
Peru  18.7  16.3  9.2  101.5
Mexico  25.1  27.5  21.0  68.9
Turkey  23.0  16.7  26.5  37.4
Argentina  ...  22.2  19.1  298.7
Source:  World Development Report, 1989 p. 189.
Table 8.  EGYPT:  INFLATION TAX
FOR ALTERNATIVE MONEY HOLDINGa  PATTERNS
FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88
ACTUAL MONEY HOLDING
Inflation Rate (%)  14.3  16.1  25.2  15.2
Inflation Tax (%  GDP)  4.8  6.1  10.6  6.7
ONE-HALF MONEY HOLDING
Inflation Rate  57.1  64.5  100.6  60.8
Inflation Tax  3.3  4.0  5.7  4.7
ONE-FIFTH MONEY HOLDING
Inflation Rate  85.7  96.8  150.9  91.2
Inflation Tax  4.3  5.1  6.9  6.0
Source:  World Bank data for actuals; simulations based on
equation 2 for alternative scenarios.
f  Money holding is simply defined here as currency plus demand and
time deposits in domestic currency.16
understanding  of the  consequences  of inflation. If irrationality  is the
explanation  behind  Egypt's  huge inflation-tax  base,  the  system's  stability
cannot  be taken  for  granted. Sooner  or latter,  persistent  and  increasing
inflation  will drive  people  away  from  domestic-currency  deposits,  leaving  the
burden  of the  underperforming  public  sector  debt  on the  banking  system  alone,
which  may  be unable  to  cope  with that  burden.
It is also  possible  that  economic  agents  must accept  negative  expected
:eal  interest  rates  simply  because  alternatives  are  lacking. Evidence  for
this  line  of argument  comes  from  the  period  1987-88,  when the  Islamic
investment  companies  were  allowed  to collect  savings  at (effectively)  a free
market  rate.  It is  estimated  that  some  LE 4 billion  were  deposited  in those
companies,  which  pay  out  yields  in the  range  of 2 to 5  percent  per  month.
Some  of these  companies  subsequently  went  bankrupt,  leaving  depositors  with
large  losses.
Foreign  currency  deposits  (mostly  in  U.S.  dollars)  may appear  to  be an
alternative  to domestic  assets. In fact,  these  deposits  have grown  at a  much
faster  rate  than  the  LE deposits  and  have  continued  to  grow to date.  By the
end  of calendar  1989,  about  45 percent  of  money  and  quasi-money  was  held in
foreign  currency. This  raises  important  questions  on the  ability  to continue
financing  the  budget  deficit  with the  inflation  tax.  Increased  holding  of
foreign  currency  means  a decline  in  holdings  of domestic  currency. This is
equivalent  to moving  toward  a lower  inflation  tax  base in  Table  8.  In fact,
one  plausible  explanation  for  the  low  monetary  base of Latin  American
countries  may  be the substitution  of foreign  assets  for  holdings  in  domestic
currency.
The  expected  remuneration  of foreign  currency  deposits  far  exceeded  that
on domestic  currency. These  deposits,  typically  denominated  in  U.S. dollars,
were expected  to  earn  LIBOR  rate  coupled  with gains  from  exchange  rate
devaluation. During  the  1980s,  the  mean  nominal  return  on time  deposits  in
local  currency  has been  estimated  at 10.6  percent,  while  the  corresponding
return  on foreign  currency  was 26  percent  (Dailami  and  Dinh,  forth.).
The  question,  therefore,  is not  whether  people  switched  to foreign
currency  but  why they  did  not switch  faster. The  answer  is that  domestic
residents  cannot  freely  convert  deposits  in Egyptian  pounds  into  U.S. dollar
deposits. Instead,  only traceable  bank accounts  from  abroad  can  be held as
foreign  currency  deposits. This effectively  prevents  a faster  dollarization
of the  economy. As explained  earlier,  the  current  foreign  exchange  regime  is
an asymmetric,  non-market,  administered-exchange-rate  system. All legal
transactions  must  be made at one  of the  official  rates.
Effectively,  then,  holders  of domestic  currency  cannot  legally  convert  it into
foreign  currency. There  is a foreign  exchange  black  market,  but it is  heavily
policed,  and  penalties  for  dealing  in it are  severe.
This  leaves  the  stocking  of real  goods  as the  only  viable  alternative  to
domestic-currency  deposits. The  problem  is that,  in general,  those  goods  are
not liquid  or are  costly  to store  safely.  Notably,  there  exist  very active
markets  for  jewelry  in Egypt,  especially  gold,  but secure  storage  costs  may  be
proportionally  too  big for  a small  investor.17
The  above  argument,  however,  cannot  explain  the  entire  stock  of money
balances. It implies  that  Egypt's  large  inflation-tax  base is due  to the
effective  suppression  of its  black  foreign  exchange  market.  This traps
domestic  savers  into  real-loss-making  deposits,  indirectly  helping  to finance
large  public  sector  deficits. However,  tough  policing  of that  black  market
only  started  after  1987  when  an official  commercial  bank  rate  was  established.
Prior  to that  year,  there  had  been  less  restriction  on the  parallel  foreign
exchange  market. In other  words,  the  conversion  into  foreign  currency  was  an
available  option  during  most  of the 1980s,  and  yet,  negative  expected  real
interest  rates  were operative.  Also,  in spite  of foreign  exchange  controls,
the  economic  incentives  for  dealing  in the  black  market  are  huge.  Assuming
that  the  exchange  rate  there  follows  an exact  purchasing  parity  power,  and
that  there  is  no inflation  abroad,  the  maximum  value  of the  percentage  bid-
ask  spread  acceptable  to customers  would  be equal  to the  absolute  value  of the
real interest  rate  on deposits,  which  is around  10  percent.  This  should  be
appealing  enough  for  clandestine  dealers  to  continue  doing  business.
Overall,  the  most  plausible  explanation  for  the  enormous  base of the
inflation  tax,  i.e.,  the  holding  of  underperforming  domestic-currency  deposits
by Egyptian  savers  appears  to  be mild  money  illusion  during  the  beginning  of
the 1980s. When this  waned,  repression  of the  foreign  exchange  market  closed
other  avenues. If this  explanation  is  valid,  then  the  system  is
unsustainable. Inflation  may  not  yet  have  surpassed  the  critical  threshold,
beyond  which  real-value  losses  and/or  arbitrage  profits  become  too  big to  be
ignored.  When that  threshold  is  reached,  savers  will  no longer  accept  the
current  level  of  nominal  expected  interest  rates.  If they  withdraw  their
implicit  support  for  the  banking  system,  it,  in turn,  will not  be able to
afford  its  holding  of public  debt.  The  budget  will  not feel  the full  impact  of
this  change,  because  a large  part  of the  debt  is still  held  by captive  sources
of fund  such  as the  Pension  Fund.  Still,  in the  end, the  government  will  have
to  accelerate  inflation  in order  to raise  the  same  inflation-tax  revenue  on a
shrinking  base.
IV.  EQUITY  ASPECTS  OF THE INFLATION  TAX
It is well  known  that  unanticipated  inflation  benefits  debtors  at the
expense  of creditors  and that,  ceteris  paribus,  those  with fixed  incomes  such
as civil  servants  and  pensioners  usually  suffer  the  most.  The  aggregate
inflation  tax  discussed  above,  while  important  to the  financing  of the  budget
deficit,  raises  more concerns  on the  equity  aspects  of the  tax  than  on grounds
of efficiency.  After  all,  from the  country's  perspective,  the  losses  of one
group  are  offset  by the  gains  of others. From  a policy  viewpoint,  it is  even
more important  to ask  about  the  tax incidence  issue:  who  pays for  this  tax  and
is it levied  according  to the  ability  to  pay?  This  section  attempts  to  answer
these  questions.
In Egypt,  the  conventional  tax  system  does  not  embody  horizontal  equity,
for  it is still  based  on a schedular  system  with different  tax  rates  for
different  sources  of income. Most income  tax  comes  from  the  salaried  workers.
There  is still  a high rate  of tax  evasion  among  professionals  and those18
working  in the informal  sector. With respect  to  vertical  equity,  or the
ability  to pay, the  existing  income  tax  does  indeed  have a progressive
component--if  the  tax  is  collected.
Individual  income  tax  revenues,  however,  amounted  to less than  2 percent
of total  revenue  in fiscal  1987,  compared  with 10  p,.xcent  in  Morocco  and  6
percent  in  Tunisia.  ln fact,  the  income  tax  averaged  '.5  percent  of GDP  over
fiscal  1981-87,  which  is  very low  compared  with other  middle  income  countries.
Table  9 compares  Egypt  with countries  having  similar  characteristics.  This
comparison  shows  that  while  government  revenues  are  high in Egypt,  the  share
of indirect  taxes  is  also  exceptionally  high.  To the  extent  that  the  sales
taxes  and  customs  tariffs,  the  most important  sources  of indirect  taxes,  are
regressive  compared  with income  taxes,  the  tax  system  is fairly  regressive.
To the  extent  that  the  share  of indirect  taxes  has increased  during  the  1980s,
this  feature  has worsened.
An analysis  of tax  incidence  is  beyond  the  scope  of this  paper,
especially  given  the  scarcity  of data. Previous  studies  (e.g.,  Eckaus  et al.,
1976)  concluded  that  the  system  is  mildly  progressive. The existing
distribution  of income  in Egypt  compares  rather  well  with other  developing
countries. The  ratio  of incomes  of the  richest  20  percent  of the  population
to the  poorest  20  percent  is about  6 to 1,  and Egypt  ranks  in the  top  third
among  the  46 countries  where  such  measures  were  available.'°  Information  on
the  distribution  of assets  and  wealth  is  not available. The task  of assessing
the  incidence  of the  inflation  tax  is  made  difficult  by the  lack  of data  on
interest  income Data are  lacking  because  of the  exemption  of interest  on
deposits  with banks  and the  post office,  as  well as all  interest  earned  on
nonresident  holdings  (domestic  and  foreign  currency),  as stipulated  by Law 157
of 1981.
A. Inflation  Tax  and the  Corporate  Income  Tax.
To compare  the  inflation  tax  with other  income  taxes  in  Egypt,  we
decompose  the  economy-wide  inflation  tax  into  business  and  household
categories. Table  10 shows  the  components  of the  tax  paid  by the  business
sector. The inflation  tax  paid  by this  sector  amounted  to  between  1 and  2
percent  of GDP,  which  suggests  that  the  sector  is  well aware  of the  adverse
effects  of the  tax  and  has  been successful  in avoiding  it.  The  gross  tax
amounted  to about  3-4  percent  of  GDP,  which  is significant,  but the  sector
also  received  subsidies  amounting  to about  2  percent  of GDP.
IO/  World  Development  Report  1989,  p. 222.19
Table  9.  GOVERNMENT  REVENUES
An International  Perspective
(1987)
Egypt Morocco Tunisia Peru  Argentina US
Total  Revenue  (as  X of GDP)  31.0  25.6  31.0  11.9  21.6  20.1
Percentage  of  Total
Revenues  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Of Which:
Individual  Income  Tax  1.4  10.4  5.5  2.7  .2  43.1
Corporate  Income  Tax  10.5  7.7  6.2  12.7  .1  9.3
Property  Taxes  1.0  2.5  1.9  5.9  6.7  .8
Social  Security  13.5  5.2  7.9  ---  25.2  32.8
Domestic  Taxes  of Goods
and  Services  11.1  46.0  19.8  41.8  37.4  3.5
Taxes  on International
Trade  12.4  14.2  28.4  29.2  12.0  1.7
Other  Taxes  6.3  4.7  1.5  1.6  3.0  ---
Other  Non Tax  and Income 43.81  9.3  28.8^  6.1  15.4  8.8
Source: World  Development  Report,  1989,  and  Government  Financial  Statistics
Year Book,  1988,  p. 39.
a  Includes  petroleum  income.
Although  corporate  income  tax  currently  accounts  for  a larger  share  of revenue
than individual  tax,  over  40 percent  of the  former  is  paid  by revenues  from  oil  and
the  Suez  Canal. Effectively,  the  corporate  sector  pays  very little. Although  the
official  rate  ranges  from  32 to  40 percent,  depending  upon  the  sector,  most
businesses  benefit  from  a  wide  range  of  exemptions  and  deductions,  amounting  to a
rather  liberal  tax  holiday  extended  by the  corporate  tax  laws,  such  as Laws  1,  43
(now  230),  86, 157,  159,  and  the  generous  provisions  related  to investments.
Given  that  most of the  formal  corporate  business  sector  is  publicly  owned,  and
most private  businesses  prefer  to  keep their  operation  small  in  order  to avoid
taxation,  it is likely  that  most of the  corporate  income  tax is  paid  by public
enterprises,  while  the  private  sector  pays  very little  of this  tax. By forcing
everyone  to  pay indirectly  through  the  public  enterprises,  the  business  component  of
the  inflation  tax  may  have a  progressive  aspect. It  should  be noted  that  the  size  of
that  inflation  tax  is almost  as large  as the  actual  corporate  tax  paid  by the
business  sector,  excluding  oil  and  Suez  canal  revenue.20
Table  10.  EGYPT,  INFLATION  TAX  PAID  BY THE  BUSINESS  SECTOR
FY95  FY86  FY87  FY88
ASSETS
C(PB,CBE)  0.8%  1.0%  1.5%  0.9%
DD(PB,BC)  0.2%  0.3%  0.4%  0.3%
DD_CLEAR(PB,BC)  -0.0%  -0.0%  -0.0%  -0.0%
DD(PB,IDB)  0.1%  0.1%  0.1  0.1%
L(PB,NIB)  0.9%  1.3%  2.9%  1.4%
LIABILITIES
L(BC,PB)  0.1%  0.4%  1.4%  0.0%
L(IDB,PB)  0.3%  0.5%  1.2%  0.5%
GROSS  INFLATION  TAX  2.0%  2.6%  4.9%  2.7%
GROSS  SUBSIDIES  0.4%  0.9%  2.6%  0.5%
NET INFLATION  TAX  1.6%  1.7%  2.3%  2.2%
Source: Derived  from  Appendix  data.
B. Inflation  Tax  and  the Individual  Income  Tax.
Table  11  presents  the  inflation  tax  paid  by the  household  sector.
At its  peak in fiscal  1987,  this  tax  represented  over 8  percent  of GDP,
compared  with the  0.5  percent  of  GDP  actually  paid in  as the  formal  income
tax.  Households  pay inflation  tax  mostly  on currency  holding,  time  deposits,
and  assets  held  by the  NIB.  It is important  to  note  that this  sector  has  very
little  debt  owed to the  other  sectors,  so that  its  gross  and  net inflation
taxes  are  very close. The large  magnitude  of the  tax  indicates  that  the  tax
system  is  much  more regressive  than  the  usual  analysis  indicaces. The
inflation  tax  could  be thought  of as  a flat  rate income  tax  with no deductions
and  no exemptions.  To the  extent  that  the  inflation  tax  is  withheld  at source
and there  is  no evasion  or cheating,  it  does embody  a positive  element  of
fairness. However,  in terms  of equity,  because  it is  a flat  rate  tax, it is
much  more regressive  than  other  forms  of income  taxes  that  have progressive
rates  built  in.21
Table  11.  EGYPT,  INFLATION  TAX  PAID  BY  HOUSEHOLDS
FY85  FY86  FY87  FY88
ASSETS
C(HH,CBE)  1.5X  1.8%  2.6%  1.9X
DD(HH,BC)  0.41  0.51  0.8X  0.51
DD  CLEAR(HH,BC)  -0.0%  -0.0X  -0.11  -0.01
TD(HH,BC)  0.61  1.01  2.4X  1.1l
DD(HH,IDB)  0.0X  0.0X  0.01  0.01
TD(HH,IDB)  0.0X  0.0X  0.11  0.0X
L(HH,NIB)  0.7X  1.0%  2.61  1.0X
LIABILITIES
L(BC,HH)  0.01  0.01  0.11  0.01
L(IDB,HH)  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01
GROSS  INFLATION  TAX  3.21  4.31  8.41  4.51
GROSS  SUBSIDIES  0.01  0.01  0.11  0.01
NET INFLATION  TAX  3.21  4.31  8.31  4.51
Source: Derived  from  Appendix  data.
As mentioned  above,  the  existing  system  of formal  income  tax  on
individuals  in  Egypt  appears  to  be mildly  progressive. In  addition  to the
general  tax  on global  income,  there  are  four  scheduled  individual  income
taxes. The  general  tax,  which  represents  less  than  1  percent  of total
revenue,  is fairly  progressive  because  of the  high  exemption  level  (LE  2000
per year),  and  a highly  progresaive  tax  rate schedule,  which  ranges  between  8
and  65 percent. Of the  four  schedular  taxes,  the  largest  is  the  tax  on
commercial  and industrial  profit,  which  has the  same  rate structure  as the  tax
on corporations  and  varies  between  32  and  40 percent.  This  tax,  as  well as the
tax  on capital  income  and  on noncommercial  professions,  is  expected  to  be
progressive. The tax  that  appears  to  have some  regressive  properties  is the
tax  on salaries,  which  varies  between  2  and 22  percent.
All in  all, the  inflation  tax  is  more  regressive  than  other  income
taxes. Moreover,  many  of the  rich  are  more  able to  keep  assets  in foreign
currency,  as are  workers  from  abroad. To that  extent,  it is  most  likely  that
the  middle  and low  income  groups  are  paying  a high  proportion  of this  tax.
C. Inflation  Tax  and  the  Social  Security  Tax.
In addition  to the  regressive  nature  of the inflation  tax  on currency
and deposits  held in the  banking  system  by households  and  by the  business
sector,  the  net  lending  that  these  two  sectors  extend  to the  NIB,  through
their  contribution  to the  Social  Security  system,  also  constitutes  a22
regressive  element.  As  shown  in  Tables  10  and  11,  the  inflation  tax  from  this
source  contributed  more  than  50  percent  of  the  total  inflation  tax  in  the
economy.  The  Social  Security  system  consists  of  a  general  scheme  covering
government  employees  and  the  formal  private  sector,  as  well  as  three  other
schemes  covering  the  self-employed,  farmers,  the  working  poor,  and  Egyptian
workers  abroad.  Contributions  to  the  general  scheme  from  the  private  sector
are  40  percent  of  monthly  salary  up  to  LE  250  and  35  percent  for  salaries
above  LE  250. Hence,  it  is  a  regressive  scheme,  in  addition  to  the  issue  of
intergenerational  transfer.  Furthermore,  the  sustainability  of  such  a  system
is  increasingly  called  into  question,  particularly  in  view  of  the  low  real
rate  of  retarn  from  the  public  investments  to  which  these  funds  are  allocatbd.
V.  POLICY  IMPLICATIONS.
The  magnitude  of  the  inflation  tax  and  its  negative  impact  on  equity
raise  several  concerns.  First,  the  base  of  this  tax  has  been  maintained
through  a  combination  of  some  money  illusion  with  controls  on  foreign  exchange
and  interest  rates.  Barring  continuing  money  illusion,  when  these  controls
disappear,  as  they  should  if  Egypt  were  to  achieve  sustainable  growth  by
implementing  a strong  program  of  stabilization  with  adjustment,  the  forces
that  have  kept  this  tax  base  large  will  disappear.  The  tax  base  will  quickly
shrink,  at  least  during  the  initial  period.  If  the  budget  deficit  cannot  be
adjusted  fast  enough  (and  usually  years  are  required  for  fiscal  measures  to
take  effect,  while  financial  decontrol  could  yield  results  overnight),
pressures  on  domestic  prices  will  build  up  quickly.  For  instance,  if  for  some
reason--perhaps  lack  of  confidence  or  lack  of  external  financing  commitments-
-the  dollarization  accelerates,  the  change  will  be  facilitated  by  the
liberalization  of  the  foreign  exchange  market.  Meanwhile,  if  the  budget
deficit  cannot  be  adjusted  fast  enough  to  reduce  the  need  for  the  inflation
tax,  the  inflation  rate  will  accelerate  in  the  manner  indicated  by  Table  8.
Alternatively,  if  the  liberalization  of  the  financial  market  reduces  the
base  of  the  inflation  tax  (perhaps  overnight),  while  the  budget  deficit  is
still  maintained  at  the  present  level,  inflation  could  accelerate  to  the  level
prevailing  in  some  Latin  American  countries.  This  could  occur  independently
of  adjustments  in  relative  prices,  which  would  also  be  needed  if  structural
adjustments  were  to  take  place.  Therefore,  the  coordination  of  financial
policies,  whose  implementation  is  normally  fast,  with  policies  in  the  real
sphere  is  crucial.
Second,  the  approach  used  here  to  calculate  the  inflation  tax  can
facilitate  this  crucial  coordination  by  enabling  one  to  determine  who  is
paying  how  much  of  the  inflation  tax. Such  knowledge  is  important  not  only
for  the  sequencing  of  reform  but  also  for  its  equity  aspects,  which  have
proved  to  be  just  as  valuable.  Of  course,  in  the  longer  run,  such  policy
cannot  substitute  for  a  complete  liberalization  of  all  markets  to  attain
maximum  efficiency.
Third,  the  ultimate  issue  on  the  real  side  must  be  addressed;  the  budget
deficit  must  be  cut  one  way  or  another.So  long  as  it  remains  huge,  and  cannot
be  financed  by  other  means,  the  inflation  tax  is  still  necessary.The  financial23
side  cannot  be  left  to  bear  the  adjustment  burden  of  the  real  side  for  long.
The  bottom  line  is  that  the  root  cause  of  the  inflation  tax--namely,  the
budget  deficit--has  to  be  resolved  quickly.24
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APPEND,X
DETAILS  ON THE CONSOLIDATION  OF INSTITUTIONS.
To illustrate  the  method  used to  estimate  inflation  tax  on  nonfinancial
sectors,  this  appendix  shows  the  balance  sheits  for  various  institutions  in
fiscal  1985,  as percentages  of  GDP.  The  source  of the  data  is the  Central  Bank
of Egypt.  Lines  from these  balance  sheets  are  then  summed  up in  Tables  2 and  3
in  the  text,  to  derive  the  net financial  position  of the  business  sector  and
of  households,  respectively.
The same  formalism  is  used  here as in  the  text.  Let  A(i,j)  be the
financial  asset  owed  by sector  i  arising  from  transaction  in sector  J,  and
B(i,j)  be the  financial  liability  of sector  j  to sector  i.  The following
categories  of assets  and liabilities  are  used:
R  Reserves
L  Loans  in domestic  currency
FCL  Loans  in foreign  currency
C  Cash  in  vault
DD  Deposits  in  domestic  currency
DD CLEAR  Checks  held in clearance
FCDD  Foreign  currency  demand  deposits
TD  Time deposits  in domestic  currency
FCTD  Time deposits  in foreign  currency
B  Bonds
NW  Net  worth
The  sectors  include:
CBE  Central  Bank
BC  Commercial  Bank.
IDB  Other  Financial  Institutions,  including  the  investment  and
specialized  banks.
NIB  National  Investment  Bank
PB  Private  Business
HH  Households
CG-PA  Central  Government  and  Public  Authorities
PSE  Public  Sector  Enterprises26
Table A-1.  BALANCE  SHEET  FOR CENTRAL  BANK  OF EGYPT, FISCAL 1985





















VERTICAL  CHECK  0.01
TOTAL  ASSETS  47.91
TOTAL  LIABILITIES  47.91
ASSETS-LIABILITIES  0.0127
Table  A-2. BALANCE  SHEET  FOR  COMMERCIAL  BANKS,  FISCAL  1985











































Table  A-3. BALANCE  SHEET  FOR  THE  NATIONAL  INVESTMENT  BANK,  FISCAL  1985






















Table  A-4. BALANCE  SHEET  FOR  OTHER  FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS,  FISCAL  1985
(Other  Banks,  Including  Development  Banks)
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